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MARKET REACTION TO ACQUISITION
ANNOUNCEMENTS AFTER THE 2008 STOCK
MARKET CRASH
Ozge Uygur, Rowan University
Gulser Meric, Rowan University
Ilhan Meric, Rider University
ABSTRACT
Market reaction to mergers and acquisitions is a popular research topic in finance. It has been well
documented in empirical literature that target companies earn significant abnormal market returns in
corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes, and the effects of whether the acquirer
is a domestic firm or a foreign firm, on target firm abnormal returns have not been studied sufficiently. In
this paper, we make a contribution to the extant literature on these subjects by studying the abnormal
market returns earned by U.S. target firms acquired by domestic and foreign firms after the 2008 stock
market crash. Our test results indicate that U.S. targets that were acquired by other U.S. firms earned
significantly higher abnormal returns, compared with targets acquired by foreign firms, after the crash.
We also find that the target companies earned greater abnormal returns in non-friendly acquisitions than
in friendly acquisitions during this period.
JEL: G01; G34
KEYWORDS: Financial Crisis, Mergers and Acquisitions
INTRODUCTION

M

ergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been a popular research topic in finance. The notion
becomes more appealing during the financial crisis times. For example, according to a New York
Times article, M&A activity rose 23% in 2010 (Merced, et. al., 2011). Not just the number of
M&A activities but also the characteristics of the crisis-time acquirers become interesting and need to be
further evaluated. Literature provides preliminary explanations for mergers during financial crisis, for the
cases of Asian and European cases (Baek, et. al. 2004; Mariana, 2013), however studies on US financial
crisis intervals is left out.
Regarding the US markets, it has been well documented in empirical literature that target companies earn
significant abnormal market returns in corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes
on target firm abnormal returns have not been studied sufficiently. In addition, literature lacks studies
examining the effects of the type of the acquirer, i.e. the acquirer being a domestic or a foreign firm, on
target firm abnormal returns.
In this paper, we make a contribution to the extant literature on these subjects by studying the abnormal
market returns earned by U.S. target firms acquired by domestic and foreign firms after the 2008 stock
market crash.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the literature review for the topic.
Data and methodology is described in the following section. We present our empirical findings in the
section titled “Results”. In the last section of the paper, we summarize our findings and conclusions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The synergistic benefits of mergers and market reaction to merger announcements have been studied
extensively. The empirical literature documents evidence that the shareholders of target companies
experience substantial gains after an acquisition. However, the shareholders of bidder companies generally
experience either a small gain or a loss (Sudarsanam et al., 1996).
The findings regarding bidder returns are inconsistent. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that
bidding firm shareholders do not lose value in acquisitions. However, value destruction for acquiring firms
has also been well-documented. These studies argue that the reason for the value loss could be various
managerial actions such as hubris (Roll, 1986), managerial entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988; Jensen,
1986), or wrong managerial decision-making (Morck et al., 1990). Some additional factors that may also
influence the bidder value after an acquisition include the effect of the payment method (Martin, 1996;
Harford, 1999), growth/investment opportunities (Lang et al., 1991; Martin, 1996), and past bidder
performance (Morck et al., 1990). In addition, Akdogu (2007) suggests that bidders overpay due to
competition during the bidding process.
Cross-border mergers is another area in need of further research. Among the rare papers available, Starks
and Wei (2013) provides evidence that bidder abnormal returns increase with the quality of the corporate
governance of the bidder. Approaching the topic from another perspective, Becher, et. al. (2010) shed light
to the merger gains in the very much neglected industry of utilities. There are also many studies on how
the target firms benefit from mergers. Overall, the consensus in the literature appears to be that the
shareholders of target firms enjoy value increases (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Dodd and Ruback, for example, provide empirical evidence that the stockholders of target firms can earn
large positive abnormal returns regardless of the acquisition being successful or unsuccessful. Competition
among bidders appears to increase target returns (Bradley et al, 1988) and targets with poor prior
performance appear to benefit even more (Lang et al., 1989). The ownership structure also appears to have
an impact on target returns. While more managerial ownership increases, more institutional ownership
decreases, target gains (Stulz et al., 1990). Offenberg et. al. (2012) evaluates the effect of poor acquisition
history of the targets on the premium received by that target.
Although mergers and acquisitions are among the most extensively studied subjects in finance, the effects
of stock market crashes on merger and acquisition activities have not been studied sufficiently. The market
values of all companies fall sharply during stock market crashes. Therefore, many companies become
attractive acquisition targets to both domestic and foreign buyers. Sherman and Badillo (2010) report that
weak dollar and low company valuations made U.S. targets cheaper and encouraged foreign buyers after
the 2008 stock market crash.
The 2008 stock market crash was the worst stock market crash in U.S. history since the Great Depression.
U.S. stocks lost 55 percent of their market value from October 9, 2007 to March 9, 2009. Our objective in
this paper is to study the market reaction to domestic and foreign acquisitions of U.S. target firms after the
October 9, 2007-March 9, 2009 stock market meltdown which lowered the market valuations of many U.S.
firms drastically making them attractive acquisition targets for both domestic and foreign buyers. For
comparison, we study three time periods of equal length: the pre-crash period (January 1, 2005-October 8,
2007), the crash period (October 9, 2007-March 9, 2009), and the post-crash period (March 10, 2009December 31, 2011).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data collection process consists of three steps. First, we identify the U.S. public firms acquired by
domestic and foreign firms during the January 1, 2005–December 31, 2011 period. Secondly, we group the
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target firms into three groups based on their merger announcement dates: Announcements between January
1, 2005-October 8, 2007 are considered as pre-crash-period announcements, those between October 9,
2007-March 9, 2009 are consider as crash-period announcements, and those between March 10, 2009December 31, 2011 are considered post-crash-period acquisitions. Lastly, we collect the balance sheet data
from the COMPUSTAT database and the market data from the CRSP database for the target companies.
Since the financial characteristics of financial firms differ from industrial firms, financial firms with a SIC
code 6000-6999 are excluded from the study.
The acquisitions data are extracted from the Capital IQ database. After identifying the U.S. public firms
acquired by domestic and foreign firms during the January 1,2005-December 31, 2011 period, we obtained
the financial data of these companies from their year-end financial statements in the COMPUSTAT
database for the fiscal year one year prior to the year of the acquisition. In order to mitigate the influence
of the outliers on the results, we winsorized the sample at the 1% and 99% levels.
As the final step of our data collection process, we obtained the daily returns data of the target companies
from the CRSP database. CRSP value-weighted index returns were used as a proxy for market returns (see:
Servaes, 1991; Louis, 2005). To assess the impact surrounding the merger announcement date, the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated (see: Song and Walking, 2000). We use the five-day
period [-2,2] surrounding the announcement day as the event window in the calculation of the CARs (To
check the robustness of the results, CARs over the three-day period around announcements [-1,1] was also
used. In addition, we also calculated CARs by using log returns. The results were similar.) Our sample
includes 132 U.S. target firms with no missing data over the study period. Eighty-seven of these companies
were acquired by other U.S. firms and 45 were acquired by foreign firms. The break-down of the target
firms, based on the acquisition announcement date, is presented in Table 1. The summary statistics for the
target firms are presented in Table 2.
Table 1: Sample Information
Before the Crash
During the Crash
After the Crash
Full Sample
Targets acquired by Domestic Firms
25
20
42
87
Targets acquired by Foreign Firms
10
14
21
45
All Targets
35
34
63
132
Table 1 displays the breakdown of the target firms, based on the acquisition announcement date and the type of the acquirer. It provides the number
of target firms acquired by domestic acquirers and those acquired by foreign acquirers. Also for each group, the firms are classified as those with
merger announcement date before, during or after the financial crisis.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Targets Acquired by Domestic and Foreign Firms
Targets Acquired by Domestic Firms
Targets Acquired by Foreign Firms
Variables
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Total Assets
2,233.9
469.07
6,489.5
6,840.8
798.78
25,396
Current Assets
1,267.4
289.93
3.845.7
3,414.6
577.01
11,722
Net Fixed Assets
966.55
59.110
3,421.4
3,426.2
123.24
13,860
Sales
1,689.5
434.53
4,770.6
5,226.5
503.07
18,050
Net Income
133.59
12.780
580.54
298.44
23.501
1,029
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the target firms, while grouping those target firms based on the type of the acquirer. Mean, median and
standard deviation figures are displayed for the target firms acquired by domestic firms and for those acquired by foreign firms. The main variables
reported in the table are Total Assets, Sales and Net Income. Total Assets value is also broken down to Current Assets and Net Fixed Assets values.
The values are in thousands of dollars.

Our methodology is as follows. First, we examine the CARs at the univariate level, by comparing the mean
values of the two groups and then testing the significance of the differences. Next, we use multivariate
linear regression analysis to further examine the target company CARs by controlling for important factors
such as firm characteristics, year effects and industry effects.
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RESULTS
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the CARs of the target firms around the acquisition
announcement dates. Panel A shows the CAR results for the three periods. Panel B shows the CAR results
for the targets acquired by domestic and foreign buyers.
The results in Panel A indicate that targets get a positive market reaction and receive an average of 12.5%
positive abnormal return during the five-day event window around the announcement date. The returns
appear to decrease during the crash period along with increased volatility in market reaction.
The results in Panel B show that, in general, the targets acquired by domestic buyers receive more favorable
market reaction compared with those acquired by foreign buyers. Both reactions are positive. On average,
the targets acquired by domestic buyers receive an average of 14% abnormal positive return, while the
targets acquired by foreign buyers receive an average of only 9% abnormal positive return.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the Target Firms
Panel A: CARs for the Targets during the Three Time Periods
Variables
Mean
Median
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
All Three Periods
0.1256
0.0909
Pre-Crash Period
0.1202
0.1173
Crash Period
0.1101
0.0534
Post-Crash Period
0.1370
0.0861
Panel B: CARs for the Targets Acquired by Domestic and Foreign Buyers

Std. Dev.

10th Percentile

90th Percentile

0.1757
0.1387
0.2279
0.1635

-0.0469
-0.0350
-0.0789
-0.0264

0.3469
0.2747
0.4322
0.3469

Variables
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
10th Percentile 90th Percentile
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
All Targets
0.1256
0.0909
0.1757
-0.0469
0.3469
Targets Acquired by Domestic Buyers
0.1436
0.1135
0.1705
-0.0350
0.4110
Targets Acquired by Foreign Buyers
0.0908
0.0593
0.1823
-0.0632
0.3158
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firms around the acquisition announcement dates.
Panel A shows the CAR results for the three periods, pre-crash, crash, and post-crash periods. Panel B shows the CAR results for the target firms
acquired by domestic and foreign buyers. Mean, median, standard deviation, 10th and 90th percentile values of the CARs are displayed for the
relevant group of firms.

Next, we conduct a mean difference test for the CARs of the targets acquired by domestic buyers vs. those
acquired by foreign buyers. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: CARs Mean Difference Test: Targets Acquired by Domestic Buyers vs. Targets Acquired by
Foreign Buyers
Mean Values
Variables
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
All Three Periods
Pre-Crash Period
Crash Period
Post-Crash Period

Targets Acquired by
Domestic Buyers

Targets Acquired by
Foreign Buyers

Difference

t value

0.1436

0.0908

0.0528

1.65 *

0.1019
0.1521
0.1645

0.1661
0.0500
0.0822

-0.0640
0.1021
0.0823

-1.25
1.30
1.92 **

Table 4 reports the mean differences of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firms acquired by domestic buyers and those acquired
by foreign buyers. T statistics and the relevant significance levels are reported at the last column. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

The results indicate that, in general, the targets acquired by domestic buyers earned significantly higher
CARs compared with those acquired by foreign buyers. The difference is significant at the 5-percent level
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for the post-crash period and at the 10-percent level for all three periods. The mean CARs of the targets
acquired by foreign buyers is higher compared with that of the targets acquired by domestic buyers in the
pre-crash period. However, the difference is not statistically significant.
We use multivariate linear regression analysis to further examine the effect of the time period, and whether
the buyer is a domestic firm or a foreign firm, on target company CARs. The regression model used in the
analysis is as follows:
(1)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼2 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)
+ 𝛼𝛼3 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼4 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛼𝛼5 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)

CARs

+ 𝛼𝛼6 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + � 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + � 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 (𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝜀𝜀

DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY
CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY
FRIENDLY ACQUISITION DUMMY
FIRM SIZE
DEBT RATIO
PERFORMANCE

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-2,2] of target companies,
the dependent variable in the regressions.
1 if the buyer is a domestic firm, 0 otherwise.
1 if the target was paid cash, 0 otherwise.
1 if the acquisition was friendly, 0 otherwise.
Natural log of total assets.
Total debt divided by total assets.
Return on Assets: Net income divided by total assets.

To assess the impact of the acquisition announcement on target returns, following Song and Walking
(2000), the CAR variable is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns over the five-day period [-2,2]
surrounding the acquisition date. In order to capture the impact of the type of the buyer, we use a
DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY variable that equals 1 if the buyer is a domestic firm and zero otherwise.
Previous studies suggest that acquisition announcements tend to result in higher positive CARs for targets
in cash mergers (see: Martin, 1996). To capture this effect, we use a CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY
variable in our regressions that equals 1 if the target company is paid in cash and zero otherwise. Previous
studies also suggest that acquisition announcements tend to result in higher positive CARs for targets in
friendly mergers (see: Morck et al., 1988). To capture this effect, we use a FRIENDLY ACQUISITION
DUMMY variable in our regressions that equals 1 if the acquisition is friendly and zero otherwise.
Our model also includes three additional control variables representing key firm characteristics that have
been used in previous merger studies: FIRM SIZE (see: Servaes, 1991), the natural log of total assets, DEBT
RATIO (see: Bruner, 1988), total debt divided by total assets, and PERFORMANCE (see: Lang et al., 1989),
the return-on-assets ratio.
The regression results are presented in Table 5. The results with the full sample are presented in the first
column of the table. The results for the three time periods are presented in the next three columns.
The regression coefficient of the DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY has a positive sign and it is statistically
significant at the 10-percent level for the post-crash period. This result indicates that the U.S. target firms
that were acquired by domestic firms earned significantly higher abnormal returns, compared with those
that were acquired by foreign firms, in the post-crash period.
The regression coefficient of the FRIENDLY ACQUISITION DUMMY has a negative sign and it is
statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the post-crash period. This result indicates that U.S. target
firms earned significantly higher abnormal returns in non-friendly acquisitions than in friendly acquisitions
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the post-crash period. The regression coefficient of the dummy variable is also statistically significant at
the 10-percent level with a negative sign for the full sample.
Table 5: Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable = Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the Targets
Explanatory
Variables

All Acquisitions

Intercept

0.2789
(1.79)

Domestic Buyer Dummy

(1)
*

Acquisitions Before
the Crash
(2)

Acquisitions
During the Crash
(3)

Acquisitions
After the Crash
(4)

0.2623
(1.14)

0.1812
(0.58)

0.1080
(0.54)

0.0490
`(1.38)

-0.0383
(-0.52)

0.0168
(0.16)

0.0810
(1.77)

Cash Acquisition Dummy

0.0619
(1.34)

0.0050
(0.06)

0.1254
(0.75)

0.0690
(1.17)

Friendly Acquisition Dummy

-0.0762 *
(-1.78)

-0.0583
(-0.82)

0.0128
(0.11)

-0.1375
(-2.25)

Firm Size

-0.0018
(-0.14)

0.0073
(0.26)

-0.0182
(-0.45)

-0.0047
(-0.29)

Debt Ratio

0.0436
(0.47)

0.0642
(0.41)

-0.1927
(-0.74)

0.0939
(0.72)

Performance

0.1930
(1.41)

0.1543
(0.78)

0.6016
(0.99)

0.2371
(1.24)

Dummies for years

yes

yes

yes

yes

Dummies for industries

yes

yes

yes

yes

Adjusted R2

0.0252

0.1624

0.1788

0.2327

F Value

0.80

0.57

0.54

1.14

*

**

Sample Size
132
35
34
63
Table 5 presents the regression analysis results with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the dependent variable. The model used for the
regression
is
as
follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼2 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) +
𝛼𝛼3 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼4 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛼𝛼5 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝛼𝛼6 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) +
∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 (𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝜀𝜀. Coefficient estimates are displayed and the relevant t statistics are given in parenthesis underneath. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

The regression coefficients for the CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY, FIRM SIZE, DEBT RATIO, and
PERFORMANCE variables are not statistically significant for the total sample and for none of the three
periods. These results indicate that these variables were not significant determinants of abnormal target
returns during the period studied.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Market reaction to corporate acquisitions is a popular research topic in finance. It has been well documented
in the empirical literature that the stockholders of target companies earn positive abnormal market returns
in corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes on corporate acquisitions have not
been studied sufficiently.
The 2008 stock market crash is the worst stock market crash in U.S. history since the Great Depression.
U.S. stock prices fall by 55 percent from October 2007 to March 2009. The lower market valuations of U.S.
companies after the crash made them attractive acquisition targets for both domestic and foreign buyers. In
this paper, we study the market reaction to acquisition announcements after the 2008 stock market crash
with the event-study methodology.
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Our findings indicate that, in the post-2008 crash period, the stockholders of U.S. target firms earned
significantly higher abnormal market returns if the acquirer was a domestic firm compared with a foreign
buyer. We also find that the abnormal market returns earned by the stockholders of U.S. target firms were
significantly higher in non-friendly acquisitions than in friendly acquisition during this period.
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